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Introduction
This chapter explores some of the main issues related to the regulation of
the cultural sector, with specific reference to heritage. As the range of activ-
ities in the cultural field raises so many different economic questions, not
all of them can be dealt with in the space available. Therefore the analysis
is restricted mainly to issues connected with built heritage. So far, the topic
has not received much attention in the literature:1 this chapter therefore
surveys some of the main issues (what should be regulated, why, how, who
should regulate?) and points out the policy implications arising from the
analysis.
Government is assumed to provide efficient remedies for market failure
in the cultural sector; however, different mixes of government policy instru-
ments – public expenditure, taxation and regulation – can be adopted
according to prevailing economic and institutional settings. Here the focus
is on regulation2 and on the policy implications stemming from its imple-
mentation: as Throsby (1997, p.19) has pointed out, ‘regulation, in the
sense of specific constraints or directives affecting behaviour, is possibly the
most widely used tool in heritage conservation, despite the fact that in most
circumstances it is the instrument least favoured by economists’.
The ‘public interest’ theory of regulation based on the welfare econom-
ics approach to market failure has been criticized because of its normative
content, and attention has turned to a closer consideration of collective
decision-making processes. It is assumed that regulators do not necessarily
aim at pursuing public interest and that regulated producers are not
‘passive adjusters’, their relationship being depicted by the well-known
‘principal–agent’ paradigm.3 In what follows, the ways in which policy may
depart from an efficient outcome in the heritage field are sketched, bearing
in mind that lack of information, which represents one of the main justifi-
cations for intervention in the heritage sector, leaves more room for discre-
tionary behaviour on the part of the regulator than in other fields,4 and
this results in the heritage sector being particularly plagued by the above-
mentioned problems.
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Heritage regulation: economic impact and policy implications
Regulation of heritage
Broadly speaking, regulation can be defined as non-monetary government
intervention usually aimed at restricting or modifying the activities of eco-
nomic agents in line with the government policy objectives.
In the heritage case, regulation is aimed at controlling the stock of heri-
tage, both from the quantitative and qualitative point of view. The ful-
filment of this objective is usually pursued by listing or registering (a
designation of lower significance) historical and archaeological sites, as
well as individual buildings5 in order to ensure the existence of the good
(for instance, to prevent its demolition) in good shape (for instance, impos-
ing on the owners of designated buildings restrictions on use, on their
appearance and the way restoration and re-use is carried out) and impos-
ing limitations on the use of land affecting heritage buildings.
Regulation therefore constrains the exercise of property rights: owners
are obliged to comply with prescriptions and penalties are involved for non-
compliance. A particular feature of heritage, compared with other areas of
the cultural sector, is the share of listed and registered buildings in private
ownership in many countries (Schuster, 1998).
In addition to these forms of regulation, which Throsby (1997) defines
as hard regulations, there are also non-enforceable directives (charters,
codes of practice, guidelines and so on) implemented by agreement and not
involving penalties, which can be defined as soft regulations.
In the heritage field, regulation has certain advantages compared to other
government tools. Its adoption or removal takes less time than is required
for other forms of public intervention (such as, for instance, subsidies or tax
expenditures) and, therefore, it allows for a greater timeliness of public
action. Flexibility, in fact, can be extremely useful in heritage to cope with
the necessity of quick decisions, such as preventing the demolition of a
building. At the same time, heritage regulation exhibits some features
related to the definition of the scope of regulation that are worth noting.
Identification of heritage
A feature of regulation in heritage is that the size of regulated sector is not
well defined ex ante, but is a matter for the discretion of the regulator. This
is due to the fact that the identification of what is heritage is not unambig-
uous, being based to a large extent on the evaluation of experts hired by the
government who may have contrasting views on orders of priority concern-
ing the extent and the type of intervention. As Peacock (1994) has pointed
out, cultural heritage ‘become[s] identified as heritage goods usually by
archaeologists and historians who have obtained some form of official
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recognition or public acceptance of their status as experts in determining
their artistic or historical significance’.
Since there is no objective way of identifying what deserves to be listed
as heritage and what priority has to be established in setting the agenda for
public intervention, the type of expert (archaeologist, art historian and so
on) involved in this kind of decision and the features of the decision-
making process are quite important in determining the size and the com-
position of the stock of cultural heritage as well as the type of conservation
that can take place. Different meanings can be assigned to the word ‘con-
servation’: in the World Bank (1994) definition it ‘encompasses all aspects
of protecting a site or remains so as to retain its cultural significance. It
includes maintenance and may, depending on the importance of the cul-
tural artifact and related circumstances, involve preservation, restoration,
reconstruction or adaptation or any combination of these’. The range and
intensity of regulation appear to be more the endogenous product of the
public decision-making process than just a policy instrument in the heri-
tage field: from this perspective, it is not without significance that the broad
discretionary power enjoyed by regulators is coupled with the extension of
the concept of heritage observed in some countries.6
Though it is outside the scope of economic analysis to define what ‘heri-
tage’ is, it is within it to analyse means and to evaluate the policy implica-
tions of government regulation, making clear the shortcomings resulting
from the public decision-making process.
Regulation: economic impact
The economic impact regulation varies with different types of heritage;
roughly speaking, heritage can be located along a broad spectrum with two
‘polar cases’ – world-renowned heritage with unique characteristics,7 and
regional or local heritage which is known only within limited boundaries –
with many intermediate cases. The degrees of freedom increase along the
spectrum because private owners come into the picture and the role of the
regulator enlarges. For world-level heritage, the list of the goods deserving
conservation is beyond discussion and any decision about conservation
comes under the scrutiny of public opinion. On the other hand, according
to the ‘stance’ taken by the regulator, there might be room for discussing
the extent of regulation for heritage of minor importance as well as the type
of intervention to be carried out: for instance, preservation alone or also
adaptation. (Preservation is the term used when heritage regulations do not
allow ‘compatible’ use even if it is economically viable; adaptation implies
the modification of a place for compatible uses.) Adaptation is acceptable
where it does not substantially detract from the building or site’s cultural
significance; it may be essential if a site is to be economically viable.
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The issue of ‘minor’ heritage has not received attention in the literature,
though it is the area in which the regulator’s discretion is greatest and the
economic impact of regulation can be strong. The choice of the type of con-
servation implies a basic trade-off. If regulators adopt a conservationist
stance and heritage is simply preserved, that prevents its full enjoyment and
utilization (for instance, when restrictions prevent alterations needed to
bring the interior of an old building up to modern standards of comfort); a
substantial amount of the potential benefit is lost and the public–private
mix is likely to be adversely affected. The extent of restrictions which are not
justified by the public good argument has consequences for the very pos-
sibility of conserving historical centres and for local economic development.
The stance adopted by the regulator therefore affects the costs regulation
imposes on society. This is a crucial issue in regulation policies8 and needs
special attention in the heritage field because of the greater discretion
involved in the regulatory process. Costs include the administrative and
bureaucratic costs related to the production of regulatory acts (permis-
sions, authorizations, demolition orders, standards and so on) and the
monitoring of their effective implementation, as well as the compliance
costs imposed on all the subjects (regardless of whether private or public)
who have to comply with the prescriptions. As stated above, the size of these
costs varies according to the strength of the regulatory intervention. For
instance, when restoration is carried out, the expected costs are affected by
many elements: some can be foreseen in advance because they are closely
connected to the conservation (for example, the requirement to use special
materials, qualified operators and so on to ensure quality) and find their
motivation in the correction of externalities; others are subject to a high
degree of uncertainty as a consequence of the regulator’s decisions (for
instance, an adaptation allowed by urban planning might not be permitted
by the heritage regulator (Pignataro and Rizzo,1997). Moreover, the indi-
rect costs imposed on any activity that interferes with heritage regulation
should not be undervalued. For instance, Peacock (1994) refers to the con-
siderable hidden costs involved by planning regulations imposing the diver-
sion of roads to protect archaeological sites.
The size of the overall costs involved in heritage regulation raises some
doubts about the sustainability of the related conservation programmes: a
conservationist stance of regulation, because of the related uncertainty,
may ‘crowd out’ private investments for conservation, causing a deteriora-
tion of heritage and considerable pressure on public expenditure. As a con-
sequence, the objective of the regulation policy, that is conservation of
heritage, can actually be endangered by the excessive expansion of the reg-
ulation itself. The need to introduce the opportunity cost concept to drive
the decision-making process is, therefore, called for.
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Some policy implications
On the grounds of the above considerations, it is useful to sketch very
briefly some possible institutional mechanisms available to society to
restrain the discretionary scope of regulators and to improve public partic-
ipation in the political decision-making process. The issue is crucial and
controversial at the same time: while it is widely agreed that taxpayers have
a legitimate claim to influence public decisions about heritage, as with other
policies, it is at the same time true that specific knowledge and expertise is
involved, so that these decisions cannot be left entirely to taxpayers’
choices.
It is interesting to note that the problem we face (the need for a govern-
ance structure to restrain the discretionary scope of the regulator) is
common to regulation in general. Of course, in the heritage field, for the
reasons given above, such a mechanism becomes crucial. An interesting
issue raised by Levy and Spiller (1996), in another context, is that no unique
solution can be provided to the regulatory governance structure when the
choice is constrained by what they call the ‘country’s institutional endow-
ment’, which affects the form and the severity of regulatory problems. Levy
and Spiller identify five elements of a nation’s institutional endowment: leg-
islative and executive institutions, judicial institutions, custom and other
informal norms, the country’s administrative capabilities and the character
of the contending social interests, including ideology. It follows that, to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, attention should be
paid to the institutional design.
Various means can be envisaged. On the one hand, devolution is usually
indicated as a means of increasing the accountability of government and in
the heritage field its positive effects seem to be even stronger than is usually
claimed because the links between regional/local communities and heritage
are very close. However, the findings of recent research (Rizzo and Towse,
2002) show that devolution as such is not enough to provide a framework
of rules enhancing the accountability and responsiveness of heritage regu-
lators to public opinion if no adequate incentive system is introduced in the
regulatory decision-making process.
Attention, therefore, has to be concentrated on that process. Forms of
greater public participation in decision making as well as compulsory
assessment consultation or review procedures might be included in the reg-
ulatory process; for instance, Peacock (1994) proposes that public partici-
pation could be enhanced if greater openness were to characterize the
appointments of ‘lay’ persons to decision-making bodies and if citizens
who are active in heritage matters were allowed to vote for their own repre-
sentatives within these bodies. However, the benefits should be weighed up
taking into account the likely increase in administrative costs and decrease
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in the process which would derive from it. The use of direct democracy
tools, such as referenda, has been advocated to assess public evaluation of
heritage policies but, again, the costs should not be underestimated.
At the same time, the role that voluntary associations and groups
expressing society’s interests can play in the decision-making process might
be enhanced.9 They can carry out information activities and/or promo-
tional campaigns both to raise funds and to influence the authorities, rep-
resenting a plurality of interests at a decentralized level. Moreover, the
introduction in decision making of a systematic assessment of the eco-
nomic impact of regulation could help to reduce asymmetrical information
and offer evidence for public scrutiny of the regulators’ decisions.
Finally, it might be useful at the local level to adopt codes of practice or
guidelines agreed between the regulator and those involved in restoration
activities (architects, building firms, engineers and so on) in order to make
prior commitments and reduce the uncertainty related to investment in her-
itage conservation.
Concluding remarks
A general argument stems from this analysis: the range and intensity of
heritage regulation cannot be justified in all the cases on normative grounds
since they often appear to be the endogenous product of the public deci-
sion-making process: the fact that the considerable discretionary powers
enjoyed by heritage regulators are coupled with the extension of the con-
cept of heritage observed in some countries offers evidence in this respect.
As a consequence, the objective of the regulation policy, the conserva-
tion of heritage, could actually be endangered by the excessive expansion
of the regulation itself because it would impose an unsustainable pressure
on public funds and would, at the same time, discourage private investment
in heritage.
There is no unique solution to meet the need for a governance structure
to restrain the discretionary scope of the heritage regulator, the solution
being constrained by the specific institutional framework in which regula-
tion takes place: forms of greater public participation in decision making,
such as devolution, and the improvement of the information system are
some of the means suggested here.
Notes
1. See Giardina and Rizzo (1994), Throsby (1997), Rizzo (1998), Throsby (2000).
2. Regulation may be used as an independent tool as well as a complement or a substitute
for other policies (Giardina and Rizzo, 1994).
3. For a survey of the extensive literature, see Hagg (1997).
4. For a general overview, see Sugden (1993).
5. This is a very simplified way of summarizing the complex array of legislation existing in
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different countries; a comparison between British, French, Italian and Spanish cases is
provided by Bobbio (1992).
6. Benhamou (1998) reports that the number of listed historic monuments in France
increased continuously and substantially (by almost 60 per cent) in the period 1960–95.
The concept of heritage has been extended to numerous buildings that somehow consti-
tute a memory of the past, including restaurants and factories. That study also indicates
a very extensive listed heritage in the UK.
7. This is the case, for instance, of UNESCO listed world heritage sites.
8. A general overview of this issue is offered by Hahn (1998).
9. The extent of this form of participation varies across countries, being very well developed
in Great Britain.
See also:
Chapter 32: Heritage; Chapter 48: Principal–agent analysis; Chapter 49: Public choice.
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